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How much economic value did the diffusion of broadband create? We provide benchmark estimates
for 1999 to 2006. We observe $39 billion of total revenue in Internet access in 2006, with broadband
accounting for $28 billion of this total. Depending on the estimate, households generated $20 to $22
billion of the broadband revenue. Approximately $8.3 to $10.6 billion was additional revenue created
between 1999 and 2006. That replacement is associated with $4.8 to $6.7 billion in consumer surplus,
which is not measured via Gross Domestic Product (GDP). An Internet-access Consumer Price Index
(CPI) would have to decline by 1.6% to 2.2% per year for it to reflect the creation of value. These
estimates both differ substantially from those typically quoted in Washington policy discussions, and
they shed light on several broadband policy issues, such as why relying on private investment worked
to diffuse broadband in many US urban locations at the start of the millennium.
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In September 2001, approximately 45 million US households accessed the Internet 
through a dial-up connection, while only 10 million used a broadband connection.
1 By 
March 2006, a sharply contrasting picture emerged: Approximately 47 million 
households (and growing) had broadband connections, while 34 million (and declining) 
used dial-up.
2  
The economic determinants behind this trend are straightforward: Dial-up became 
available first and diffused to more than half of US households. Broadband emerged later 
as a higher quality and more expensive alternative, albeit one available in only a few 
places and from a limited set of providers, if any. Then over time, broadband became 
more reliable and more widely available, and as that happened, many households paid to 
upgrade their Internet service.  
 The upgrade to broadband motivates a seemingly straightforward question: What 
was the contribution to new economic value created through the replacement of dial-up 
access with broadband? This type of question has appeared in prior literature measuring 
new goods, and prior work has developed two conventional approaches: One focuses on 
the creation of new economic growth, as measured by new gross domestic product 
(GDP), and the other focuses on new consumer surplus. Neither economic yardstick is 
better than the other, because each measures something different.  
                                                 
1 NTIA (2004) is the source for these statistics.  
2 See Horrigan (2007) at http://www.pewinternet.org/.  
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Addressing this topic is not solely of academic interest but also informs long-
standing policy interest in deployment of the “last mile,” that is, the supply of services for 
delivering data between the national/global data grid and end-users. In recent times the 
revenue associated with the last mile was quite large.  In fact, Internet access revenue 
measurements reached $39 billion in 2006. For some time, there has been debate about 
the structure for maximizing the economic gains from building this infrastructure.
3 Most 
of the literature does not examine -- but instead assumes -- that the infrastructure led to 
large economic gains. In contrast, this paper examines the potential for the 
(mis)measurement of those gains. 
Here, we calculate a benchmark for the two conventional approaches to 
measuring economic gains. We render these numerical estimates in the spirit of Johnson, 
who states, “That, sir, is the good of counting. It brings every thing to a certainty, which 
before floated in the mind indefinitely.”
4 In other words, we provide numerical estimates 
where before there had been none. This establishes the plausible range of the size of the 
measured economic gains from the upgrade to broadband.  
Our findings are as follows: While broadband accounted for $28 billion of GDP 
in 2006 (out of $39 billion in total for Internet access), we estimate that approximately 
$20 to $22 billion was associated with household use. Of that amount we estimate that 
broadband’s deployment created approximately $8.3 to $10.6 billion of new GDP. In 
                                                 
3  The policy concern arises from the belief that this infrastructure plays a key role in fostering 
others, and from international ranking showing that the United States has lower deployment than many 
other developed countries. See 
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html, e.g., OECD 
Broadband Portal. For an interpretation and discussion of issues, see Atkinson, Correa, and Hedlund 
(2008).  
4 From Boswell’s Life of Johnson.  
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addition, between $6.7 and $4.8 billion is new consumer surplus. In both cases, this is 
above and beyond what dial-up would have generated. The newly created GDP is 
between 40% and 50% of measured total GDP, while consumer surplus (which is not 
measured) is between 31% and 47% of the newly created GDP. We can express the latter 
gain as an equivalent decline in prices. We show that Internet access price indices would 
have to decline 1.6% to 2.2% per year to account for the consumer benefits generated 
from upgrading to broadband.  
Our estimates are interesting for a number of reasons. First, they are much lower 
than those typically quoted by Washington-based policy analysts and lobbyists, who 
regularly quote outsized economic benefits from the deployment of broadband in the 
range of hundreds of billions of dollars.
5 We believe our estimates suggest that these 
outsized estimates are dangerously misleading at best and are rendered with flawed 
economic reasoning and incorrect statistical approaches.
6  
Second, our estimate also differs from the CPI (Consumer Price Index) for 
Internet access. We correct a historically inaccurate inference about the pricing of 
Internet access and conclude that the official index’s timing of price decline is actually 
several years too late.   
                                                 
5 Crandall and Jackson (2001) forecast is a typical example, emphasizing indirect benefits with a 
title that discusses a “$500 Billion dollar opportunity.”  Crandall (2005) cites the same study and others, 
pegging the gains at $300 billion. More recently, Connected Nation (2008) pegs the benefits from national 
deployment of broadband in only rural areas at $134 Billion. For a summary of these and other studies, see 
Atkinson, Correa, and Hedlund (2008), which stresses both the direct effects from building broadband and 
a large number of secondary economic consequences, once again, coming to very large gains.  
6 For example, the report by Connected Nation (2008) uses estimates of the growth brought about 
by broadband in urban areas to estimate its impact in rural areas. Such estimates do not control for 
endogeneity or the projecting of results to ranges of data far out of sample. The report also adds additional 
benefits to broadband by focusing on the “indirect” benefits from deployment of broadband. The language 
of “direct and indirect” benefits obscures the boundary between private willingness to pay and externalities, 
as found in conventional economic approaches.  
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Third, our second conclusion leads to another implication: We inform 
understanding about why the national policy of the last decade has had the effects it did. 
Initially, most federal policy sought to subsidize the deployment of dial-up technologies 
to less-served areas and users
7; but, at the outset of the millennium, policy changed.
8 The 
new policies relied largely on the private incentives of private actors to deploy broadband 
technologies, without subsidy or any regulatory intervention. In retrospect, they seemed 
to work well—that is, wire line-based broadband diffused widely. Yet, this outcome was 
puzzling in light of the lack of price change measured in the CPI. In fact, our findings 
resolve this puzzle: Price indices undervalued the gains to users, and these gains were 
what motivated the upgrade at many households. In addition, our recalculation of 
conventional GDP estimates illustrates that the incremental gain to a broadband supplier 
from creating new revenue covered the costs of investments in urban and suburban areas. 
In short, there was no policy magic to relying on private incentives. Private benefits 
simply exceeded private costs if both are measured correctly.    
As emphasized by Fogel (1962), Bresnahan and Gordon (1997), and many others, 
neither yardstick for economic gains is easy to measure in ways consistent with standard 
                                                 
7 In the early 1990s, US national policy focused on deploying technologies that allowed for higher 
data-transfer rates over telephone lines, such as ISDN (Integrated Service Date Networks), which supported 
bandwidth speeds of 128k. Later, changes to access and interconnection policies altered investment 
incentives for incumbent local exchange providers. For example, the e-rate program was a provision of the 
1996 Telecommunication Act and sought to subsidize the cost of deploying dial-up access for hard-to-serve 
areas. Later still, the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) reclassified broadband investment 
outside the range of procedures used to review common carriers, raising incentives for such investment. For 
an overview, see Goldstein (2005), Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005) and Greenstein (2008).  
8 It is no exaggeration to say that policy was shaped by events, such as the implosion of 
competitive local exchange competitors (the so-called “Telecom meltdown”), the AOL/Time Warner 
merger, the dot-com bubble burst, and Worldcom’s and Enron’s bankruptcies. So too did the effects of the 
administration change on the legal interplay between the FCC and courts reviewing its decisions. For an 
overview, see, e.g., Goldstein (2005), Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005) and Greenstein (2008).  
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economic foundations. In this case, rendering benchmarks requires accurate data on 
prices and quantities for household use of the Internet, and these must be interpreted 
through an appropriate model. While we do not present any statistical advances in this 
paper, we do illustrate the importance of using well-known economic methods for an on-
going policy debate, particularly where such methods are regularly overlooked. 
Assembling the best publicly available sources of data is also another of this paper’s 
contributions. A third contribution is the calibration exercise we perform using different 
assumptions consistent with the available data. That exercise exposes the importance of 
specific assumptions and focuses attention on areas that require improvement and more 
precision. In that sense, our study is in line with the sentiments expressed by Flamm and 
colleagues (2007),9 who argue for putting US broadband policy on a footing more firmly 
founded in conventional economic reasoning and transparent statistic approaches.  
Our plan is as follows: In Section II, we briefly discuss our approach to measuring 
the economic value generated by broadband.  In Section III, we measure the diffusion and 
pricing of Internet access services during the years between 1999 and 2006 in relation to 
the GDP and CPI.   In Section IV, we discuss the data we collect; and in Section V, we 
perform our simulations of the value created by the diffusion of broadband. Finally, in 
Section VI, we conclude with an assessment of future directions for policy discussions. 
 
                                                 
9 Flamm, Friedlander, Horrigan, and Lehr (2007) focuses on a wide range of issues, such as 
measuring productivity and assembling new data to accommodate novel on-line economic behavior. The 
primary goal of this paper is to dig deeply into one aspect of this broad agenda.  
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II. The Measurement of Economic Benefits from New 
Goods 
 
There is an established literature for measuring the economic gains from the deployment 
of a new good. It has been widely accepted since Fogel (1962) that it is an error to focus 
solely on the demand for and supply of the new good. Instead, attention should be paid to 
the additional benefits beyond what would have occurred without the deployment of the 
new good. Fogel famously illustrated this concept by measuring the contribution of 
railroads to economic growth in the United States in the mid-Nineteenth Century, while 
stressing the economic growth above and beyond what canals would have provided had 
they continued to operate. In this paper, there is an analogous measurement—between the 
deployment of broadband and what would have occurred had broadband never deployed, 
i.e., had dial-up continued to operate at a large scale. 
Here, we measure two gains from the new good by addressing two questions: 
First, what is the increase in revenue (GDP) above and beyond what would have been 
generated had dial-up continued? Second, what is the increase in consumer surplus 
beyond what would have occurred had dial-up continued? When doing these exercises we 
will follow convention and not worry about which vendor or user gains or loses, but will 
only compute an aggregate measure. 
We focus on revenue instead of producer surplus because we are hampered by the 
lack of precise information about the unit cost of provision, which is necessary for an 
estimate of producer surplus at each point in time. Instead, we examine the difference in 
revenue between vendors with broadband and those without, absent multiplier and  
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general equilibrium effects. That is, we estimate how much the GDP increased in the 
Internet access market as a result of the deployment of broadband. Then, to provide a 
ballpark of the producer surplus generated, we compare that estimate against estimates 
for upgrade costs for an initial broadband build-out and typical variable costs per year. 
To measure consumer surplus ideally, we should measure the difference in “areas 
under the demand curves” between the actual demand for broadband and what consumer 
surplus would have demanded had dial-up continued and not been replaced by 
broadband. This is challenging to do for many reasons, but one is primary here: We 
cannot observe what the dial-up market would have looked like had broadband not 
diffused. Instead of measuring two demand curves, we get close to our ideal measure by 
looking at estimates of user willingness to pay for the upgrade to broadband. 
Our approaches provide a more precise interpretation of the economic gains from 
broadband in comparison to the approach commonly employed in policy discussions 
today, which focuses on “indirect/direct” benefits from the upgrade.
10 Here, we measure 
the economic factors considered by parties involved in a transaction—anything that 
shapes the perceived or anticipated costs of using dial-up, the willingness to pay for an 
upgrade to broadband, and/or the decision not to return to dial-up. The following factors 
shape revenue for suppliers: Sale of second lines, revenue for dial-up access, and revenue 
for broadband access. The following factors shape the anticipated value of broadband 
service and, hence, the willingness to pay for an upgrade: Savings on a second line, 
                                                 
10 Such reasoning can be found throughout policy discussion about the economic benefits from 
diffusion of broadband. See e.g., Atkinson, Correa, and Hedlund (2008) for a summary.   
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savings on commute time, anticipated health and entertainment benefits, and anticipated 
savings on phone bill (e.g., if user moves to VoIP, or Voice-Over Internet Protocol). 
Our understanding of these factors circumscribes our interpretation of the 
estimates, which do not include externalities, such as benefits or costs not considered by 
the parties involved in the transaction. For example, our interpretation does not include 
externalities to suppliers, such as the benefits to Cisco from selling more Wi-Fi 
equipment to users, to Amazon from additional sales because broadband users experience 
more satisfying service, or to Google from more advertisement sales because users stay 
on-line longer. Similarly, our interpretation does not include externalities to users. Those 
would be unanticipated or unperceived costs or gains—such as the unanticipated 
slowness that one neighbor’s use imposes on another’s in a cable architecture, or the 
benefits that one person’s participation in a p2p (peer-to-peer) network confers on 
another (as long as there is no membership fee). 
II. i. Gaps in Measurement 
While our exercise follows the spirit of Fogel (1962), we recognize the criticism that 
technical change in a key nationwide infrastructure motivates an endogenous response in 
complementary goods and services (see, e.g., David 1969). This alternative approach 
would argue that had broadband never diffused, many of the complementary services 
(e.g., downloadable music, video sharing) might not have been invented, or alternative 
innovations might have dominated an industry where dial-up had primacy, thereby 
altering the demand for dial-up. In this alternative view, the Fogel-exercise is mis-
specified when these complementary services have great economic significance. Further,  
10 
 
that misspecification invariably becomes more likely, and of greater economic 
importance, as time passes.  
We avoid addressing such debates for two reasons. First, we focus on such a short 
time period (eight years). More to the point, our data will show that most US households 
have comparatively little experience with using on-line broadband. Second, most surveys 
of on-line household use after broadband upgrades show only mild changes in the time 
and composition of activity on-line. These changes are not symptoms of radical 
transformations in economic behavior, as would occur if the entry of complementary 
services were economically important to the economic gains realized by users who adopt 
broadband.
11     
The approach in this paper will lead to much smaller estimates of the economic 
benefits from the diffusion of broadband than found in existing policy studies. This arises 
for several reasons: First, as noted, we follow the spirit of Fogel's research and others 
have not.
12 Second, this study does not count any indirect benefits. In our reading of other 
studies, it appears that the presence of indirect benefits has been license for analysts to 
blur the boundary between internalized benefits and externalities in economic growth. At 
worse, analysts have added many benefits to the deployment of broadband far out of 
scale with the private benefits motivating adoption.
13 Third, we calibrate against the 
                                                 
11 Surveys show that the greatest changes in behavior among new users of broadband occur in 
music downloading and total time on-line, not in the general distribution of time spent among different 
categories of activities other than music. See e.g., http://www.pewinternet.org/. 
12 For example, Crandall and Jackson (2001) calculate the entire area under the demand curve for 
broadband, but leave open question as to whether that consumer surplus would have arisen with dial-up 
anyway. 
13 See, e.g., Connected Nation (2008) for an especially egregious example of misuse of this 
license.   
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actual diffusion pattern of broadband over eight years, not any forecast of an ideal year or 
adoption pattern. Calibrating against history (instead of a forecast) grounds estimates and 
removes considerable hype. 
III. Measuring Broadband Services 
III.i. Internet Deployment Policy  
To familiarize readers with this technology and market, we provide a picture of 
deployment, adoption, and revenue generation for broadband. All these data tell a similar 
story. The diffusion of dial-up coincided with the initial use of the Internet in most 
households. The diffusion of broadband came a few years later and, most commonly, 
involved an upgrade of the bandwidth for many households.   
For all intents and purposes, during this period, broadband service was delivered 
to households primarily in two forms of wire-line service — over cable or telephone 
lines. The former involved a gradual upgrade to cable plants in many locales, depending 
on the generation of the cable system.
14 The latter involved upgrades to telephone 
switches and lines to make it feasible to deliver a service called Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL). Both of these choices typically supported higher bandwidth to the household than 
from it—called Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) in the latter case. Some 
                                                 
14 In many areas, households also had access to direct supply of high-speed lines, such as T-1 
lines. This was prohibitively expensive for almost all users except businesses, and even then, it was mostly 
used by businesses in dense urban areas, where the fiber was cheaper to lay. Fiber to the home has recently 
become cheaper, and may become a viable option sometime in the future. See Crandall (2005). During the 
1990s most cable companies sold access to the line directly to users, but made arrangements with other 
firms, such as Roadrunner or @home, to handle traffic, routing, management and other facets of the user 
experience. Some of these arrangements changed after 2001, either due to managerial preferences, as when 
@home lost its contract, or due to regulatory mandates to give users choice over another Internet Service 
Provider (ISP), as occurred after the AOL/Time Warner merger. See Rosston (2006).  
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cable firms built out their facilities to deliver these services in the late 1990s, and many—
especially telephone companies—waited until the early to mid 2000s. 
Broadband has several appealing features that users experience in heterogeneous 
ways. In comparison to dial-up service, broadband provides households with faster 
Internet access and better on-line applications. In addition, broadband services are also 
“always on,” and users perceive that as a more convenient service.
15 Broadband also may 
allow users to avoid an additional phone line for supporting dial-up. That said, many 
factors shape the quality of a user’s experience, such as the capacity/bandwidth of lines, 
the number of users in the neighborhood in a cable system, the geographic location of a 
system in the national grid, the frequency of use of sites with geographically dispersed 
caching, and the time of day at which the household performs most activities. In brief, 
generalizations are hard to make beyond the obvious: Broadband gives the user a better 
experience than dial-up access.
16  
III.ii.  Measuring Diffusion  
Broadband was available in only a few locations in the 1990s and the early 2000s, but it 
became more available over time. User demands for high-bandwidth applications 
increased as households became familiar with high-bandwidth Internet applications (such 
                                                 
15 Surveys show that a maximum rate of 14.4K (kilobytes per second) and 28.8K were 
predominant in the mid 1990s for dial-up modems. The typical bandwidth in the late 1990s was 43K to 
51K, with a maximum of 56K. DSL and cable achieved much higher maximum bandwidths, typically 
somewhere in the neighborhood of a maximum rate of 750K to 3M (megabytes per second), depending on 
the user choices and vendor configuration. 
16 Download speed may not reach the advertised maxima. In cable networks, for example, 
congestion issues were possible during peak hours. In DSL networks, the quality of service could decline 
significantly for users far away from the central switch. The results are difficult to measure with precision.  
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as music downloading). Firms also rolled out new services as more users acquired 
broadband (e.g., Web2.0 applications), which then generated even more adoption. 
 
This story is consistent with Figure 1, which provides a summary of the federal 
government’s efforts to collect data about the adoption of the Internet.
17 The first 
questions about broadband use appear in 2000 and show a growth in adoption, peaking at 
close to 20% of households in 2003, when these surveys were discontinued for some 
time.
18 Recent data about household use, collected by the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, show that the diffusion continued in the anticipated direction, accelerating 
                                                 
17 The first government surveys of household Internet adoption date back to 1997. These came 
from additional questions in the CPS Supplement, which had added questions about household use of 
personal computers in 1995. See NTIA (1995). These were continued with surveys in 1997, 1998, 2000, 
2001, and 2003. See NTIA (2004). The survey was stopped after 2003, then reinitiated in 2007. The latest 
data are not available, as of this writing. CPS Supplement surveys prior to 1997 also examined PC use at 
home, but asked about use of generic on-line services, such as CompuServe, not Internet access. For 
simplicity and consistency, we stick with Figure 1.  
18 The descriptive results were published in reports authored by staff at the NTIA. See NTIA 




19 Notably, adoption reached over 47% of households by 2006.  We will 
discuss this data in more detail below. In Table 1, we provide a summary of another set 
of efforts by the FCC to measure the deployment of broadband lines, information that the 
FCC collects from surveys of firms.
20 It tells the same story as Figure 1, but from the 
vendor-side of the market: Vendors were increasingly deploying broadband lines, 
presumably to meet growing household demand.  
TABLE 1 Residential broadband deployment, 1000s of households 
         
Year  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
DSL     291.8  1594.9  3616.0  5529.2  8909.0 13119.3 17371.1 20143.3 
 
Cable    1402.4  3294.5  7050.7  1342.5 16416.4 21270.2 24690.0 27720.4 
 
Satellite    50.2  102.4 195.0 257.0 341.9 422.6 529.4  1839.4 
Source: Federal Communications Commission.
21  
There are no revenue estimates for household broadband services, but we can 
place a bound on an estimate for the combination of household and business revenues. 
The US Bureau of the Census estimates revenues and publishes these in its Annual 
Service Survey. Table 2 provides a summary of these reports, to which we have made 
considerable adjustments to correct for related measurement issues (See Appendix).
22 We 
                                                 
19 See http://www.pewinternet.org/.  
20 The FCC has never asked about deployment of dial-up. It also has never asked about the prices 
of broadband. 
21 See http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html, Broadband Reports, Table 3, for precise 
definitions. This table covers any line with at least 200kps in either direction. 
22 The adjustments are for changes in sampling frame; Census does not return to historical 
estimates and review the sampling frame of prior estimates to make all the estimates consistent over time.  
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expect that between 60% and 75% of the revenue in Table 2 is from households, 
depending on the year and access mode.
23  
The growth in revenues in Table 2—from $5.5 billion in 1998 to $39 billion in 
2006—is astonishing for an entirely new market, especially one that did not start growing 
quickly until after 1995. Broadband revenues comprise approximately half the total 
revenue over the eight years, beginning with less than 6% in 1999 and growing to 72% of 
the total revenue in 2006. 
These revenue levels are important to stress, because access fees generated most 
of the revenue during the first decade of the commercial Internet. The typical household 
spent more than three-quarters of its time on-line at free or advertising-supported sites, 
devoting most of its Internet budget to access fees, not subscription fees.
24 Although 
subscription-based services and advertising services have started growing rapidly after 
2003, the amount spent on access fees each year far exceeds advertising revenue. 
Advertising revenue is now growing at a more rapid pace than subscription fees, and it 
may exceed access revenue soon, but not as of this writing.
25 
                                                 
23 We came to that estimate by the following means. First, our estimates below suggest household 
revenue for the Internet overall makes up 70% to 75% of the total revenue. Second, the FCC broadband 
deployment report puts the number of broadband lines to households at roughly two-thirds of the total 
number of lines deployed. Since revenue per line for business likely exceeds that for households, it is 
plausible that household revenue is closer to 60% of total revenue.  See Table 13: High Speed Services for 
Internet Access at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html. Hence, in the text we say “60% to 75%”. Note 
that Table 1 and 2 are not comparable, since Table 1 is for households only, while Table 2 is for households 
and business.  
24 See, e.g., Goldfarb (2004). 
25 The following will provide a sense of the magnitudes of different activities. In the 2006 Annual 
Service Survey, Web Search Portals (NAICS 518112) generated $6.3 billion in advertising in 2006, out of 
$9.1 billion in total revenue. This is up from $4.5 billion and $3.3 billion in advertising revenue in 2005 
and 2004, respectively. In addition, Internet Publishers (NAICS 516) generated $2.6 billion in revenue in 
2006, up from $2.3 billion and $1.8 billion in 2004 and 2005, respectively. That is still far less than the $39 
billion in access revenue in 2006.  
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TABLE 2 Adjusted revenue for access markets (millions of dollars) 
    
Year  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006 
Dial-up  5499  8966  12345 13751 14093 14173 14081 12240  10983 
DSL   228  1245 2822 4316 6954 10240  12034 15066 
Cable 
modem  138 274 903 2600  4117  7372  9435  11139  13156 
Wireless   668 1140 
Source: Census Annual Survey. See Appendix for adjustments. 
III.iii. Measuring Prices 
Another way to measure technical progress is through the decline in prices. The CPI for 
Internet access is officially called Internet services and electronic information providers, 
which the Bureau of Labor Statistics began compiling in December 1997, after 
approximately 20% of US households had adopted the commercial Internet.
26 Table 3 
displays a monthly quote from the price index, taken the last month of each year, and 
normalized to 100 for the year in which the index began.   
 
TABLE 3  US Internet access price index 
 
Y
Year 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
I
Index  100.0 103.3 96.0 95.7 100.3 99.6 97.6 97.2 94.5 77.2 73.1 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov. 
  
 
                                                 
26 Entry into the provision of dial-up Internet services began to explode in 1995 and 1996. The 
potential appeal of selling access to the World Wide Web induced most of the entry in 1995 and 1996. See 
Downes and Greenstein (2002).  Stranger and Greenstein (2007) estimate a quality-adjusted price index for 
access between 1993 and 1999 and find that most of the dramatic price decline came in 1995.  
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The series has a distinct pattern: It indicates that the official price index for 
Internet access in the United States went mildly down and up during the five years of the 
dot-com boom and bust, between December 1997, and December 2002.
27 It then declined 
5% over the next three years, between December 2002, and December 2005—again, a 
mild decline for a downturn. Then, in late 2006, it declined more than 18% from its base 
(i.e., (94.5 – 77.2)/94.2 = .183). We note that the drop continued (illustrated with the 
quote from 12/07). It settled at a 23% from its base in January 2007 (i.e., (94.5 – 
73.4)/94.5) and it stayed there for the year.
28 Also, looking closely at the monthly data 
(also not shown), a mild downward trend began in the fall of 2006, with the big drops 
occurring in October, November, and December.
29  
We believe this pattern is primarily due to America On Line’s (AOL) pricing 
decisions. Specifically, in the fall of 2006, AOL announced a dramatic change to its 
pricing: It was moving to advertising-supported service in response to losing customers to 
broadband.
30 We see the index behave in ways consistent with AOL’s announced price 
change. By the fall of 2006, the trade press conjectured that AOL’s service went to less 
                                                 
27 With only a few exceptions, the index does not change much month to month or year to year, so 
we could have taken a sample of another month and gotten a similar picture. 
28 This pattern differs from many closely related categories, which is somewhat puzzling at first 
glance. Specifically, during the period from December 1997 to December 2005, official price indices for 
the United States demonstrated the following patterns: Computer software and accessories declined 42%; 
personal computers and peripheral equipment declined 88%; telephone hardware, calculators, and related 
consumer items declined 55%; and wireless telephone services declined 35%.  
29 The indexes in July, August, and September 2006 are 97.3, 94.7, and 93.1, respectively. The 
index then drops to 87.0 in October, 81.1 in November, and 77.2 in December, settling at 73.4 in January 
2007. 
30 AOL did retain a number of revenue-generating activities other than advertising. For example, it 
gave users the option to maintain an email account for a nominal fee (e.g., $5/month).  
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than one-quarter of the US households that used the Internet.
31 When one vendor makes 
up approximately 25% of an index and it announces a 100% decline in price, it is 
tautological that the index must decline by 25%. That is nearly what we observe: A 23% 
decline in price in a very short period.  To be clear, this is merely “informed” speculation, 
since we have not examined the confidential BLS data. It is theoretically possible that 
other prices were moving downward and upward at the same time.
32  
To bolster our contention that AOL’s price change was primarily responsible for 
the observed trends, we note two other examples consistent with that theory. First, after 
AOL’s merge with CompuServe in the summer of 1999, when its market share was much 
larger, AOL attempted to give price breaks to former CompuServe users (as part of an 
attempt to move them to AOL email addresses and other services). That price break 
appeared to have moved the index down for three months—May through July. The effect 
lasted only as long as AOL’s promotion; thereafter the index returned to its previous 
level.
33 Second, no large change in nominal prices occurred for seven years. Since the 
late 1990s, AOL’s dial-up service has been $21.95 (plus or minus a dollar). Its prices 
never went down dramatically except the two times just mentioned. For most of the time 
                                                 
31 The 23% market share for the index is a plausible number. The last expenditure survey was in 
2005, but due to lags the 2006 index uses the survey from 2003. Source: BLS web site. In 2003 dial-up’s 
revenue share of household use of the Internet was approximately 53–55%. See Table 3. If AOL’s market 
share was 60% of dial-up, then a 26–27% decline is the result. For more on AOL’s market share see Alex 
Goldman’s market share rankings, at http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa_h.html, who lists 
AOL at 24% to 26% market share for 2003.  
32 Almost certainly some prices other than AOL’s were decreasing. That would have to be true to 
account for the other mild declines in the index.   
33 The price index was 103.4 in April of 1999. It declined to 77.5 in May, 53.5 in June, and 79.4 in 
July, and returned to 99.0 in August.   
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covered by this index (1998–2005), AOL was the dominant dial-up national provider by 
far, with a market share between 40% and 60% for dial-up firms.
34    
Nevertheless, our speculation is not completely air-tight because we only have 
partial information about non-AOL providers, which make up the other half of dial-up 
supply. Market share is skewed among this category of providers, but there was also a 
considerable amount of restructuring over time, so it is difficult to speculate how actual 
market events corresponded to BLS’s sampling.
35 The little systematic and public 
evidence we do have is consistent with the explanation that nominal prices did not 
change.
36  
Another piece of evidence regarding the price index is also quite speculative. It 
has to do with broadband prices, which slowly (and only recently) have become a bigger 
part of the price index.
37 For cable modem service and DSL service, price levels also 
have been largely unchanged: Respectively, somewhere between $36 and $40, plus or 
                                                 
34 Our data on AOL come from Alex Goldman’s market share rankings, at http://www.isp-
planet.com/research/rankings/usa_h.html. 
35 Rosston (2007) documents a large decline in the price of backbone services. This raises a related 
question: Why did access prices not drop with the emergence of a backbone glut in the United States, 
beginning in 2001 and thereafter? After all, the price for backbone services is a key cost input into the 
provision of access service. That question awaits further research. 
36 Stranger and Greenstein (2007) estimate prices for dial-up by all the other dial-up providers for 
1993–1999. They find little change in the median or average nominal prices between 1996 and early 1999 
(i.e., without controlling for quality). For example, the median price of a contrast for 28K service is $19.95 
and does not change between May 1996 and January 1999. The average price (unweighted by market 
share) for this same set of contracts in the same time period is $22.64 and $19.01. Most of the major price 
decline occurs prior to 1997, before BLS initiates the index; that is, between January 1995 and May 1996 
(which is coincident with the initial diffusion of the commercial browser and the beginning of the 
commercial Web).  
37 Table 3 partially hints at this fact. In that table, which included both household and business 
revenues, broadband revenue does not exceed dial-up revenue until 2004. Household revenue would track 
that pattern closely, perhaps lagging slightly because the rate of household adoption of broadband lags 
business adoption. In addition, BLS survey procedures would add an additional delay into incorporating 
that changing fraction of expenditure.  
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minus a few dollars.
38 Except for a few publicized (but largely unused) marketing 
schemes to lower prices to satisfy regulatory requirements, several sources indicate that 
broadband price levels paid by users have not changed much. There has been evidence of 
price declines only very recently (i.e., 2006) and only for the DSL prices in the Pew 
reports.
39 
III.iv.  Diffusion and Prices 
Like many new goods, broadband did not diffuse immediately to all households. 
Slowness by itself is nothing remarkable for a new good, but it is puzzling in light of the 
stable transactional prices observed in the data, as a price decline cannot be pegged as the 
catalyst for adoption in this case, as it often is for later adopters of new goods. Our 
preferred hypothesis for this puzzle is consistent with a key motivation for this paper: 
Unmeasured factors shaped outcomes. 
What unmeasured factors played a key role in stopping adoption decisions? 
Plenty of reports suggest there were changes in the availability, bandwidth, reliability, 
and anticipated performance for broadband over this time period.
40  For example, in 
many neighborhoods broadband was not available in any form for some time after 
2000.
41  Even when it became available, it may not have been reliable enough to spur 
                                                 
38 This is the price level in the 2002 sample in Savage and Waldman (2004). Pew’s estimates are 
similar for 2004 and 2006, with a decline in the average price of DSL in the most recent sample. John 
Horrigan, private communication (July, 2008). 
              
39 John Horrigan, private communication (July, 2008).  
40 This theme arises often in NTIA (2004) and http://www.pewinternet.org/.  
41 For example, NTIA 2004 reports (from a 2003 survey) that over 20% of rural Internet users did 
not believe they had broadband available, while just under 5% of urban Internet users make such a 
statement. A large number of households also report that access was too expensive. Other common reasons 
given for no Internet or broadband include lack of interest and lack of a computer at home. Even as late as 
2007, the FCC reports that only 82% of US households had access to DSL lines, while 96% had access to a  
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many households to switch quickly from dial-up, thereby inducing users to wait until 
vendors improved the infrastructure or service arm of the organization.
42 Many 
households also waited until they changed their use in sequence (e.g., learned how to use 
the Internet for music downloading on an iPod), which then led to the upgrade. 
Said another way, standard price index survey procedures measure the price at 
which the new good transacted but not the price that previously deterred the user from 
adoption. The price index should fall, but it does not because there was no measured 
price change.
43 Finding the price change and acquiring a more complete price index 
requires complete information about all the factors deterring or motivating adoption, 
which is difficult—perhaps impossible—for most price agencies to collect. 
IV. Data  
In Table 4, we summarize the data used to simulate the economic gains from the 
diffusion of broadband. Here, we provide important information about our sources and 
their limitations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cable modem provider. See Table 14, broadband deployment reports, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html.  
42 Comparing broadband deployment reports from the FCC shows evidence of upgrading by cable 
system upgrades. See the Broadband Deployment Reports at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html, 
particularly Table 5, High Speed Lines by Information Transfer Rates. 
43 This explanation is an example of what economists label a substitution bias. Such biases are 
quite common within categories of goods, as users move market share to the cheaper good, while the price 
index only records change in price, not the full change in expenditure. See e.g., the Boskin Commission 
Report (Boskin et al. 1996) or Braithwait (1980). Previously documented examples include the replacement 
of general purpose retailing outlets with discount outlets
 (Reinsdorf 1993), the diffusion of generic drugs in 
competition with branded pharmaceuticals
 (Griliches and Cockburn 1994), and the movement of voice 
communications from land-line telephony to cellular telephony (Hausman 1997).  
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IV.i. Adoption of the Internet.  
To derive the total number of adopters, we estimate the percentage use of dial-up and 
broadband technologies across all households and then multiply this percentage of 
adopters by the total number of households.
44 Data about household use of dial-up and 
broadband Internet comes from two sources, the NTIA (National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration) and Pew.
 45 We use the NTIA estimates through 2003 
and use the Pew estimates thereafter.  Pew’s data are good for measuring adoption, but 
incomplete for measuring price and quality.
46 Data about total number of households 
come from the US Census estimates.    
TABLE 4  Household Statistics, 1999–2006 
(MM)
Year    1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total  Households  105.0  106.0  107.0 108.0 109.0 110.0 111.0 112.0 
Total  Internet  Adopters  35.5  44.0  53.8 56.7 59.5 66.0 73.3 81.8 
Total  Broadband  Adopters  0.9  3.2  9.6  13.0 18.5 27.5 41.1 47.0 
Total  Dial-up  Adopters  34.5  40.8  44.2 43.7 41.0 38.5 32.2 34.7 
Total  Second  Phone  Lines  23.6  26.2  26.3 18.4 16.0 13.8 12.1 10.5 
Sources: See text. 
                                                 
44 We prefer this because it builds on surveys of users rather estimates of broadband deployment, 
such as those kept by the FCC. That choice does not matter until the end of the sample. While the FCC 
numbers do not differ much from Pew’s overall, they do differ recently. We prefer the Pew data because it 
is consistent with the data from the NTIA, and surveys of users also inform us about other relevant factors 
for measurement, as will become clear in the discussion. 
45 For years between 1997 and 2003 when we have no direct observation, we interpolate between 
the two closest known measures of adoption percentage with a target towards midyear. 
46 Pew’s surveys ask a variety of questions, most recently including questions about bandwidth, 
prices and use, but did not get complete answers. For example, 80% of respondents do not know the 
bandwidth of their broadband in the 2005 survey. John Horrigan, private communication (July, 2008).  
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IV.ii. Second Lines.  
Table 4 provides estimates of the total number of households in the United States with at 
least one second line. We gather this from FCC reports, which do not break out second-
line use into its primary purpose.
47 Prior research has shown that several factors 
determined the growth of second lines in the 1990s, including use of the Internet.
48 The 
growth and decline in households with second lines is highly correlated with the growth 
of dial-up Internet access and its replacement with broadband lines.
49 For example, in the 
latter part of the 1990s, the use of second lines grows from 11.4% in 1994, to 26.3% in 
2001. It declines after 2001—from 26.3% to 10.5% in 2006.
50  
These trends put bounds on estimates of the second lines supporting Internet dial-
up. For example, 16 million households had an active second line in 2003, a decline from 
18.4 million in 2002. The 2.4 million drop in second phone lines represents the upper 
bound for dropped lines by broadband adopters, meaning that a maximum of 53% of dial-
up converts dropped a line that year.
51 More broadly, that percentage varies between 
2002 and 2006, rising no higher than 53% and falling no lower than 25%.
52  
In our base specification, we reduce the volatility in the estimates from the role of 
second lines. Specifically, we assume that one-third of broadband adopters drop a second 
line between 2002 and 2006, while we will assume no broadband adopter drops a second 
                                                 
47 See the FCC’s 2007 Trends in Telephone Service, Table 7.4: Additional Residential Lines. This 
is the most recent available data as of this writing. It is available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/trends.html.  
48 See, e.g., Duffy-Deno (2001), and Eisner and Waldon (2001). 
49 The other primary driver of the decline in second lines is the growth of cell phone use. 
50 2006 is the last available year, as of this writing. 
51 Strictly speaking, the upper bound could be larger if more than 2.4 million broadband adopters 
dropped a second line at the same time others were adding lines, since we observe only a net change. 
52 In other years, we get different percentages, and prior to 2002 there is no decline in use of 
second lines one year to the next.  
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line between 1999 and 2001. That results in the right level of dropped second lines by 
2006, but we view this as a conservative approach (i.e., a deliberate undercount). 
A second telephone line can cost a household as little as $16 a month in some 
cities and as much as $24 before including per-minute usage charges, which are generally 
low. For our simulations, we use an average of $20.  
IV.iii. New Users and Converts.  
Neither the NTIA reports nor the Pew reports provides statistics for each year about 
whether new broadband adopters are new users of the Internet or converts from dial-up. 
At first there was good reason for this lack of information; there was no question that 
virtually all household broadband adopters had experience with dial-up before upgrading. 
Some new users, however, moved directly to broadband in later years. In his report 
describing adoption behavior in the Pew survey between 2005 and 2006, John Horrigan 
mentions that new users of the Internet comprised a large percentage of the adopters of 
broadband that year.
53 He did not mention this for earlier periods because it simply was 
not a significant factor until then.
54  
Those facts help pin down several assumptions about conversions. We have no 
way to know the rate of conversions precisely since public surveys only ask about total 
adoption in a given year, not any yearly tally of new Internet users. Yet, we are certain 
                                                 
53 John Horrigan does highlight that few adopters of broadband went straight to broadband without 
first using dial-up. Horrigan also states that 4 (out of 8) million broadband adopters were new users of the 
Internet between 2005 and 2006, and never before had Pew’s surveys found a percentage anywhere near 
that high. See http://www.pewinternet.org/.   
54 Horrigan, private communication (July, 2008).   
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that the vast majority of the broadband adopters between 1999 and 2004 were former 
dial-up users, and we are not so confident about the same fact in more recent years.  
Hence, we assume the following: For our baseline specification we will assume 
100% (all 10 million households) are converts in 1999-2001. There are approximately 37 
million additional adoptions in 2002-06, with 31 million of those occurring prior to 2005. 
The number of new users finally becomes large enough to notice near the end of our 
sample, but cannot exceed 50% of the 6 million adopters in 2006, and, to remain 
consistent with Horrigan’s observation, it is must be less than 50% of the 14 million 
adopters between 2004 and 2005. In other words, we assume that 10 million new Internet 
users among broadband adopters is too high a number, and 3 million is too low. For lack 
of better number, we will split the difference and assume 7 million in our baseline 
specification, then test alternatives assumptions.  For our baseline estimate, that means 30 
million broadband adopters between 2001 and 2006 were converts from dial-up.  For 
convenience, we will assume an 81% conversion rate for 2002 through 2006 (instead of 
concentrating it all in 2005 and 06).  
To test the importance of this assumption, we calculate implausible extreme 
bounds (81% convert rate and 100% convert rate for all years). These bounds will move 
estimates in a predictable direction, but result in outcomes outside the range of what we 
consider plausible, so they show how this assumption affects the final estimation. Below, 
in rows three and four of Table 5, 6, and 7, we provide a summary of such extreme 
bounds in comparison to our benchmark estimate.   
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IV.iv. Price Levels.  
We do not observe prices directly. Consistent with the generally reported patterns for 
nominal prices and for simplicity, we assume for all of our simulations that price is 
unchanging over time, and we set the average price level for dial-up to $20.
55 We choose 
that price because it is the reported average dial-up price for users in two CPS 
Supplements in the 1990s.
56  We assume the average price for broadband is either $36 or 
$40, depending on the simulation we conduct. Again, this is consistent with reported 
price levels in Pew reports and other research.
57 
 
V. Benchmarks  
 
We begin with estimates of the revenue generated by broadband and then consider 
estimates of consumer surplus. Following that, we provide an estimate of an equivalent 
price index. Throughout, we try to maintain a conservative stance and show how a range 
of assumptions alter the qualitative results. To be clear, this is a calibration and an 
accounting exercise. When we vary parameters we are not estimating demand; rather, we 
are holding fixed the known facts about broadband’s deployment (i.e., Table 4) and are 
                                                 
55 We could examine the effect from small price fluctuations. We do not do so below, since, for 
obvious reasons, the qualitative results change things very little.  
56 It is also the median price in Savage and Waldman (2004) and Stranger and Greenstein (2007). 
The CPS supplement asked about monthly expenditure (which looks close to monthly prices) in only two 
years and not thereafter. The consumer expenditure survey, however, continued to ask about on-line 
expenditures for Internet services every year. While it is not a price index, it looks close to prices (but does 
not distinguish between use of broadband and dial-up until after 2001). The difference between some 
expenditure and none is a good indicator of a household’s use of the Internet, and correlates with changes 
in other levels of expenditure for related goods, such as music and videos, as well as other forms of 
entertainment. See Hong (2007).  
57 For US price quotes, see e.g., Savage and Waldman (2004), Chen and Savage (2007), Crandall, 
Sidak, and Singer (2002), Rappoport et al (2003), and Flamm and Chadhuri (2007).  
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learning how changes to key assumptions about the underlying features of diffusion alter 
inferences about consumer surplus and new revenue generation.  
Throughout we maintain the comparison between broadband and a counterfactual, 
namely, what would have been supplied by dial-up in the event that broadband had not 
arisen. We keep this counterfactual straightforward: for example, we do not consider 
endogenous technical change, such as how other complementary services might have 
changed (e.g., music or video downloads) had the counterfactual technology (dial-up) 
remained dominant and un-replaced by broadband. 
V.i. Creation of New Revenue 
We begin with a calculation of a single year, 2003, to illustrate how we provide a full 
accounting of the new revenue affiliated with broadband.  In the process of explaining a 
single year, we will articulate the principles that apply to all years. 
Because the average price of residential broadband access was somewhere 
between $36 and $40 a month in 2003, residential broadband generated an annual 
revenue of somewhere between $8 billion ($36/month × 12 months × 18.5 million 
households) and $8.9 billion (if the price is $40/month).   
 We first estimate how many broadband users formerly used dial-up. On the basis 
of our previously stated assumption that with a adoption rate of 81%, 30 million users of 
broadband were converts, the new adopters of the Internet (not converts) generated 
between $455 million of revenue (if the price was $36) and $505 million of revenue (if 
the price was $40) in 2003. Converts—those who switched from dial-up—generated 
between $1.9 billion and $2.1 billion.   
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We next calculate the proportion of revenue generated by dial-up converts that 
was cannibalized, that is, when the revenue source changed while staying within the same 
firm.  If the average price of dial-up Internet access was $20 a month, then that accounts 
for $1.1 billion of cannibalized revenue.  That is not all, however. In addition to the loss 
of dial-up revenue, there was a loss of revenue from retired second phone lines, with 
which many households had supported their dial-up Internet. Using 2003 as an 
illustration once again, newly retired phone lines from dial-up converts amounted to a 
loss of $357 million in revenue for phone companies in 2003. That puts the total 
opportunity cost of lost dial-up revenue and second-line revenue at $1.4 billion.  
In summary, broadband created additional revenue between $964 million and $1.2 
billion in 2003. That accounts for both new revenue and cannibalized revenue from 
former dial-up users and retired second phone lines. 
TABLE 5.  New revenue created by broadband each year (millions of dollars) 
                        
Year  Total 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Baseline 
high price  10595.4  226.9 536.4 1548  737.4 1233.4  1986.3  3005  1322 
Baseline 
low price  8337.4 181.4 429.1 1238.4  577.6 966.1 1555.8  2353.6  1035.4 
Aggressive 
conversion  8326.5 226.9 536.4 1548  535.4 895.6 1442.3  2182  959.9 
Not 
aggressive  11410.5  269.8 724.5 2132.1  737.4 1233.4  1986.3  3005  1322 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See Appendix. 
 
Baseline high price: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Baseline low price: Broadband Price = $36; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Aggressive conversion: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-06 




We conduct similar calculations for each year, 1999–2006, which we provide in 
the Appendix and summarize in Table 5.  The aggregate revenue gain for 1999–2006 
stemming from broadband adoption is $10.6 billion in our baseline specification when 
broadband prices are $40. That is 46% of an estimated $22.6 billion in GDP at the end of 
the sample (i.e., 47 million households x 12 months x $40 per month). 
We are interested in understanding how much our assumptions matter for a 
benchmark. Table 5 shows the results. Specifically, if prices are $36 instead of $40, then 
the total estimate reaches $8.3 billion (41% of $20.3 billion). If all broadband adopters 
are converts (which is higher than plausible) and prices are $40, then our estimates of 
revenue gains are $2.3 billion lower than in the baseline case. If 81% of adopters are 
converts every year (which is lower than plausible) and prices are $40, then our estimates 
are $0.9 billion higher.  
In other words, while changes to each of these assumptions move the estimate for 
the level of created new revenue in each year in the expected direction, none of these 
alters the general pattern over time as more households switch from dial-up to broadband. 
Under any estimate, the additional revenue from the adoption of broadband is large, 
somewhere between 40% and 50% of measured revenue for households.  
We can summarize it bluntly: Measured revenue is what shows up in GDP, but 
the measured revenue is only part of the story. Approximately 40% to 50% of that 
measured revenue is new.  This means that 60% to 50% of the measured revenue replaces 
revenue in dial-up and second lines with revenue in broadband—an amount that is a 
combination of business stealing (when revenue goes from one company to another) or 
cannibalization .  
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We redid our simulations with one additional change: We accounted for changes 
in AOL’s prices. Since AOL’s prices only go up or down by a dollar or two until the last 
year, this makes little difference to the aggregate index. The only appreciable effect is 
that converts no longer save $20 at the end of 2006, since AOL’s prices become zero 
after September, 2006. That reduces the cannibalized revenue from converts by 
approximately $500 million in 2006.
58 This makes a little difference in that year, but does 
not change any other inference.   
Table 5 and our discussion stress how to decompose the results in 2006 into the 
contribution attributable to adoption in each year. There is one additional way to look at 
these results, in terms of the total benefits over the eight years from 1999 to 2006. The 
largest gains come from those households who adopt in 1999. In their first year of 
adoption they generate a 226 million dollar gain (in the baseline estimate with a high 
price). We assume they receive the same benefit in all subsequent seven years in 
comparison to the alternative, which is going back to dial-up. The same reasoning holds 
for the group who adopts the next year in 2000. By this reckoning the total revenue gains 
over the eight years are 8*226.9 + 7*536.4 + … + 1322 = 36.8 (29.0) billion for high 
(low) price baseline estimate.  
Is that a big number? It depends where one looks. It is 36% (29%) of the size of 
the total revenue ($100B) generated by dial-up over the same time period (adding 
                                                 
58 We get that by assuming that AOL has 13.1 million households in 2006, which is a 38% decline 
from the prior year, when the level was 19.5 million households. Those 6.4 million households faced an 
opportunity cost of $20 a month for eight months of 2006 instead of twelve, which reduces the opportunity 




revenue from 1999 to 2006 from Table 2). Of course, the majority of it comes from the 
latter part of the sample when there is more adoption. 
Although these calculations tell us nothing about the cost to deploy and support 
broadband or, for that matter, the precise level of profitability from its deployment, they 
do say something about the economic incentives to perform upgrades. Namely, while 
cable companies were the dominant supplier of broadband at the beginning of our 
sample, Pew’s survey finds that local telephone companies had a slightly higher market 
share than cable companies by 2006,
59 but a slightly lower price as well.  
We also could add several additional observations about how cable and telephone 
companies differed: Cable did not cannibalize any existing revenue stream, such as from 
second telephone lines or an existing dial-up ISP (e.g., Ameritech.com). Telephone 
companies, meanwhile, faced regulatory uncertainty in the earlier part of this sample 
period over the treatment of their investments. Not surprisingly, cable firms gained 
residential broadband revenue sooner than telephone companies did (see Table 1).
60 The 
only big revenue losers were dial-up ISPs, from whom all the business stealing took 
place.  
                                                 
59 This is one place where the data from Pew and the FCC do not entirely agree. Table 1 (from the 
FCC) gives high market share to cable in the most recent years (2005 and 2006) while Table 3 (from NTIA 
and Pew) does not. They generally agree in prior years. If the FCC’s data are correct, then the statement in 
the text is not correct, and cable firms have done much better in recent times than the telephone firms.    
60 The evidence for this statement is partially evident in Table 1, which shows the growth of 
household lines. Over this period, cable reached levels of adopters typically two years sooner than similar 
levels by telephone firms. It is only partially evident in Table 2, which shows revenue growth, because this 
includes both household and business growth. Cable firms, however, get very little of their revenue from 
business customers, while telephone companies get a much higher fraction. For example, comparing FCC 
statistics on broadband diffusion to all users with those for residential users for January 2006 suggests that 
less than 3% of the cable lines go to business customers (0.8 out of 29.1 million), while business generates 
a much higher fraction of telephone company revenue: Just over 10% of ADSL lines (2.4 out of 22.5 
million) and 35% of fiber lines (244 out of 685 thousand). See Tables 1 and 3 in the reports for high-speed 
services for Internet access, available at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html. Hence, Table 2 also 
suggests that cable modem access grew sooner than DSL.   
32 
 
Costs also played a role in these events, although the costs varied by setting (e.g., 
density) and time period (e.g., declining over time) Most estimates from the early 
millennium put the cost of initial upgrading of lines to cable and DSL at $400 to $500 per 
household in most urban settings, with slightly higher estimates for suburban settings 
(e.g., an additional $100 dollars) and much higher estimates for rural settings (e.g., 
another $500 to $1000 per household or more). In all cases, these cost estimates decline 
to the industry rule-of-thumb for per-household upgrade costs—as little as $250 (for 
cable) and $150 (for basic DSL) for residences in dense urban settings in most recent 
times.
61 In most cases, post-adoption maintenance costs are estimated to be low, at just 
over $100 per household per year.
62  
What do those costs mean? Consider the following illustration for a cable firm 
that does not experience any cannibalization. For the sake of illustration, consider the 
problem facing that firm if it upgrades its system for 2500 homes and expects only 20% 
of them to take up the service. At a cost of $250 per household, that means new revenues 
(at $480 a year) in Internet service, by themselves, cover the cost of the upgrade in three 
                                                 
61 David Burstein, private communications, September 2008. See also Crandall (2005) for a range 
of estimates from a variety of sources. In a cable setting this assumes the HFC network has already been 
built out to support two-way access. Following OECD (2007), Chapter 5, in the case of DSL, this assumes 
the main cost elements are: Customer Premises Equipment (modem); Local Loop (access/operational fee 
for the copper twisted pair); Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM); Aggregation Network 
(L2 switch); Broadband Remote Access Server (BAS); and a Management System. For a closely related set 
of estimates, see http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/PracticeNote.aspx?id=2899. For more recent 
estimates, see Elixmann et al.’s (2008) WIK Consult Report.  
62 Note what these assumptions imply for a static definition of producer surplus using yearly 
variable costs. At $480 dollars per year in revenue and $100 in yearly cost, the variable profits per 
household are $380. With 47 million households in 2006, that leads to $17.8 B. That static view seems less 
relevant to us than a definition that incorporates the cost of initial retrofit to enable cable modem service or 




63 Additional revenue through telephone and other services resulted in covering 
those costs sooner. Higher take-up rates also resulted in covering costs sooner. Earlier in 
the period those costs were higher, so costs were covered later. A similar calculation 
holds for DSL.
64 In other words, for most systems, the private incentives to upgrade were 
sufficient to motivate investing in upgrading most urban and suburban areas. Similarly, 
take-up rates would need to be extraordinarily high to justify even a monopoly build-out 
in most rural areas.
65  
Table 5 leads to a reinterpretation of one common occurrence in recent 
communications industry lobbying: Cable firms have crowed in public forums about the 
industry’s willingness to invest in the last decade, as represented by their aggregate 
capital expenditure. The industry’s total capital expenditures between 1999 and 2005 
amounted to $87.1 billion, never dropping below $10 billion in any given year. Some of 
this covered the costs replacing depreciated capital, of course. Yet, the acceleration in 
expenditure after 1998 (from $5 to $10 billion or more annually) is consistent with 
                                                 
63 Since only 20% adopt, the cost per adopting household would be $1250. In three years the 
maintenance expense is $300, which means variable revenue is approximately $1160 on a $40/month 
contract. Thus, the costs of upgrade are covered approximately after three years. Of course, this does not 
count the interest costs of borrowing, which would increase costs as well.  
64 The calculation is more plausible with cable firms than telephone firms for reasons alluded to in 
the text, because national broadband policy for cable investment did not appreciably change over this 
period. Hence, it is possible to examine investment and its consequences in a constant regulatory policy 
environment. In contrast, the changes in telephone broadband investment were complex over this time 
period, so providing a firm date for their change is difficult since it involves both regulatory actors and 
court decisions in a long interplay. For overview of changes to regulatory policy, see Goldstein (2005), 
Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005), and for a focus on Internet access see Greenstein (2008). 
65 For example, consider a cable firm that does not face any cannibalization issues. Even with a 
50% take up rate, the economics are not favorable for a $40 service for a rural community of 500 homes 
with $1500 per household upgrade costs and $100 per household maintenance costs. Without considering 
borrowing costs, investment costs are not covered until after eight years of revenue. For a local rural 
telephone firm facing cannibalization issues and a similar cost structure for DSL, the upgrade may be 
technically infeasible (due to length of lines), as well as simply cost-prohibitive.   
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expenditure aimed to convert cable systems to a digital delivery of cable services,
66 as 
well as facilitate additional services, such as telephone and Internet access.
67 
  Once again, we can summarize the implication for interpreting regulatory policy 
in broadband: The proper benchmark for calculating such returns was not the total 
revenue of the market in any given year. Rather, it was the incremental gains in revenue 
to those parties from incremental investment aimed at that market. Several factors played 
a role in calculating incremental gains, such as the identity of the producer, the size of 
potential business stealing and cannibalization, and the speed of household willingness to 
respond to new options. Looking at it this way, it should come as no surprise that private 
firms invested large sums of money when the incremental gains from doing so were 
potentially large, as they were for cable firms facing no cannibalization issues over all 
this time period, and as they were for both cable firms and telephone firms that faced low 
upgrade costs in urban and suburban settings later in this time period.   
 
V.ii. Creation of Consumer Surplus 
In most studies, estimates of broadband demand indicate that there is substitution 
between different forms of broadband—that is, substitution between cable and DSL—but 
only weak substitution between dial-up and broadband. The latter places some constraint 
on demand for broadband, but not much. There also is evidence of upgrade behavior, 
                                                 
66 The number of digital households increased from 12.2 million households in 2001 to 30.4 in 
2006. See http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/DigitalCableCustomers.aspx.  
67 The number of households with voice service from cable firms grew from 1.5 million in 2001 to 
7.5 at the outset of 2006. The growth has accelerated thereafter, reaching 15.1 at the end of 2007.  See 
http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/ResidentialTelephonyCustomers.aspx.   
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with broadband constraining dial-up demand, but not vice-versa.
68 Estimates of 
broadband demand generally find that it is elastic, though US estimates tend to be less so 
than those of households in other countries.
69  
For our estimates of consumer surplus we rely on one set of estimates from 
Savage and Waldman (2004). It is representative of the type of findings seen in other 
studies, but a easier to use in this context. These authors conducted an extensive survey 
of dial-up and broadband users in 2002. We prefer this study because it is based on 
slightly later data, and also because it is a survey of both users and nonusers. In addition, 
the authors used this survey to directly estimate “willingness to pay” measures for 
attributes of dial-up and broadband service, which facilitates some simple accounting of 
the value of broadband in comparison to dial-up for existing dial-up users.  This is 
sufficient for illustrations below.
70  
                                                 
68 For example, Rappaport, Kridel, Dunnt-Deno, and Alleman  (2003) find that broadband service 
is partially a substitute for dial-up, with cross-price elasticities of .7 among those with dial-up service, 
while dial-up does not act as a substitute for those with broadband (cross-price elasticity of .02). The cross-
price elasticities between cable and DLS are in the .6 and .7 range. Flamm and Chadhuri (2007) use the 
2002 Pew Survey and try imputing fewer prices than Rappaport et al. They find that demand for broadband 
is comparatively more insensitive to prices and that their detailed data show that demographic factors shape 
demand quite a bit.  Cardona et al. (2008) find qualitatively similar results to Rappaport et al, with cross-
price elasticities between broadband and narrow band of no greater than .5, and that only when these are 
the only two options. Often their estimates are smaller. 
69 For example, Rappoport et al. (2003) report an own-price elasticity of -1.46 for DSL for a 
nested logit model applied to a sample of US households in 2000, while Crandall, Sidak, and Singer (2002) 
find an own-price elasticity of -1.184 for a slightly different sample in a similar time period. Using the 
same sample, Rappoport, Taylor, and Kridel (2003), page 82, estimate elasticities for different price levels, 
finding evidence of more elastic demand. The estiamtes range from close to 1 for DSL and cable modem 
prices close to $20 a month, and they change in the expected direction. For $30 DSL prices they estimate a 
price elasticity of -2.1, and for cable modem prices of $40 they estimate -2.35.  Estimates on samples of 
households in other countries tend to find more elastic demand. For example, Pereira and Ribeiro (2006) 
find an own-price elasticity for broadband (cable and DSL) of -2.84 for a sample of households in Portugal. 
In a sample of Austrian households Cardona et al. (2007) find similar elasticities for broadband 
(approximately -2.5) in areas where there are many options, and more inelastic demand (approx -0.97) 
when DSL is the only broadband option and dial-up provides the only competition to DSL. 
70 To be clear, this choice comes with one drawback. It does not fully account for heterogeneity in 
household willingness-to-pay. It average outs such differences. We do not believe such accounting would  
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Savage and Waldman’s estimates of the willingness to pay for broadband are net 
of benefits users receive from dial-up. To remain consistent with their model we assume 
users adopt broadband if the additional benefit exceeds the additional cost of converting. 
The conversion cost sums two things: The increase in subscription fees and the net 
savings in expense for a second line. If the price of broadband is $36, then the average 
increase in subscription fee is $16 ($36 less $20). Additionally, many converts dropped a 
second phone line, saving, on average, $20 per month for those who dropped. This 
impact affects the “average” consumer surplus of converts differently each year, 
depending on the average drop rate.  
For example, Savage and Waldman’s lowest estimate of the average willingness 
to pay for broadband’s speed is around $11 per month, and their highest is around $22 for 
the most experienced and educated user. They also find that users pay more for 
broadband because it is more reliable and always on—between $1 and $18 more, 
depending on how much more reliability the user perceives in broadband. Savage and 
Waldman assume that dial-up has half the reliability of broadband, yielding an additional 
value of $9 on average.
 71   
                                                                                                                                                 
alter our benchmark calculations much, but we acknowledge it is an open question. The study of 
Rappoport, Taylor and Kridel (2003) takes steps in that direction, but did not provide sufficient information 
to make a full estimate (such as the distribution of dial-up among this population and its correspondence to 
WTP for broadband, or standard errors on their estimates of heterogeneous demand).  
71 It is reassuring that the average in the Savage and Waldman study, which examines a sample of 
only previous dial-up users, is in the same range as the estimates for Willingness-to-Pay from Rappoport, 
Taylor and Kridel (2003), which examines a sample of all households. In the latter case the average WTP 
in their entire sample is $36.8 for cable and $32 for DSL. Among a truncated sample of likely adopters, 
those with Willingness to Pay for broadband above $40, the average WTP is $53.45 for cable and $52.05 
for DSL. Note: to make their these estimates into a WTP for a conversation from dial-up to broadband, one 
would then need to have information about (or to make assumptions about) the distribution of former dial-
up users in this sample and, among that sub-sample, make further assumptions about their use of second 
telephone lines.    
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The Savage and Waldman estimates provide an estimate for the number of users 
who switched from dial-up, but not one for new users to the Internet. New adopters 
started becoming more frequent after the 2002 survey used by Savage and Waldman. 
Even though some of the new adopters (surely) had experience with the Internet (e.g., as 
students or at work), we take a conservative approach to estimating surplus for 
nonconverts. We assume their willingness to pay is what they paid (i.e., they received no 
consumer surplus).  This is consistent with our focus on generating a conservative 
estimate of the substitution bias arising solely from upgrade behavior among previous 
dial-up users.
72 
In our base specification, if the subscription fees for broadband are $40 a month, 
and someone converts from a $20 a month dial-up account, then the conversion cost is 
$20, and we call that the maximum conversion cost. For those who paid the maximum 
conversion cost, the low end of the estimates of willingness-to-pay is just enough to 
cover the additional cost.  
To be clear, this is one place in the study where we are performing a calibration, 
not estimating demand. We do not use this model to predict which household did and did 
not adopt broadband, as Savage and Waldman did. Rather, we assume that the quantity 
demanded must result in the number of adopting households, as in Table 4. Then we 
calculate the level of consumer surplus consistent with Savage and Waldman’s estimates, 
while varying assumptions about prices and conversions. 
                                                 
72 This is one place where the Savage and Waldman estimates are much easier to use than the 
estimates of Rappoport, Taylor and Kridel. Though the late provide a skewed distribution Willingness to 
Pay, they give no other indication about how these estimates compare against observable features of the 
data, such as whether households had prior experience with dial-up Internet.   
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A full accounting of this surplus can be found in the Appendix. It varies from 
$6/$10 per month on average in 1999–2001 (when the price is $40/$36 and we assume 
that no household drops its second phone line), to $11.35/$15.35 per month after 2002 
(when we assume that all converts dropped their second line).   
Table 6 provides a summary of these results. The approximately 40 million 
households that converted to broadband since the beginning of the dial-up market 
received an additional benefit from their conversion. It amounts to somewhere between 
$4.7 billion and $6.7 billion in 2006.   
 
TABLE 6 Consumer surplus in millions of dollars  




















4687.9   55.1  130.3  376.1 367.2 614.2 989.2  1496.5 658.3 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See Appendix. 
 
Baseline high price: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Baseline low price: Broadband Price = $36; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Aggressive conversion: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-06 
Not aggressive conversion: Broadband Price = $40; 81% converts 1999-06 
 
 
Comparing Tables 5 and 6 also shows how different assumptions shape estimates 
of the distribution of gains from innovation. In the two baseline cases, the total gains 




73 As expected, higher prices lead to lower consumer surplus as a 
fraction of new value generated, that is, 31.2% and 44.4% for broadband prices equal to 
$40 and $36, respectively. 
Comparing two assumptions—that 100% of broadband users upgraded from dial-
up (an aggressive conversion, which is too high) versus 81% of them (an unaggressive 
conversion, which is too low)—alters total surplus only a little, but it does alter estimates 
of the distribution of returns. Aggressive conversion reduces total surplus by $0.8 billion 
(compared to the baseline), while unaggressive conversion increases it by $0.6 billion. 
Nevertheless, these assumptions provide a very different distribution of gains from 
innovation: 43.2% and 30.0%, respectively. In comparison to the baseline simulation, 
assuming an aggressive conversion of dial-up users to broadband yields a large gain for 
consumer surplus and a commensurate loss for producer surplus. Assuming an 
unaggressive conversion has just the opposite effect. 
Plainly stated, the information in Table 5 gives a sense of the range of changes 
that come about from changes in the assumptions, but the direction of change is not 
surprising. Rather, these estimates place limits on the range of the benchmark for 
consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is between 31.2% and 44.4% of the new revenue 
generated, and this is entirely an unmeasured gain from the diffusion of broadband. 
                                                 
73 In the $40 baseline estimate, the total gains are 4818.7 + 10595.4 = 15414.1. In the $36 baseline 
estimate the total gains are 6735.7 + 8337.4 = $15073.1. When only 81% of the broadband adopters have 
upgraded from dial-up, then a reduction in price reduces new producer surplus each year, but increases 
consumers surplus by only 81% of the new revenue for vendors. The 19% consumer surplus is lost to our 
assumption that new Internet users generate no consumer surplus. The estimates for total surplus are not the 
same under different prices except under the assumption that all broadband users are converts from dial-up. 
Accordingly, in the simulation at $40 (and $36) with aggressive conversion, the total is 6349.7 + 8326.5 = 
$14,676.2. At $40 without aggressive conversion, the total is 4687.9 + 11410.5 = $16,098.4.  
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Once again, Table 6 and our discussion stress how to decompose the results in 
2006 into the contribution attributable to adoption in each year. Once again, there is one 
additional way to look at these results, in terms of the total benefits over the eight years 
from 1999 to 2006. The largest consumer surplus accrues to those households who adopt 
in 1999. In their first year of adoption they receive a 68 million dollar gain (in the 
baseline estimate with a high price), and then we assume they receive the same amount in 
all subsequent seven years. By this reckoning the total revenue gains over the eight years 
are 8*68 + 7*160.9 + … + 658 = 15.4 (22.2) billion for high (low) price baseline 
estimate.  
Is this a large number? By comparison with the size of the total new revenue, 
which is $36B ($29B), the gains to consumers generated by broadband over the same 
time period is 42% (76%) of the size of total new revenue gains. Notice that in either 
simulation new consumer surplus plus new revenue sum to approximately $51B, so 
prices simply determine the distribution of gains. 
Once again, we stress that these are benchmark estimates. First, other researchers 
found considerable heterogeneity in the demand for broadband, with some adopters of 
broadband willing to pay far above the market price. The Savage-Waldman estimate also 
measures some of this inelastic demand, but it truncates the level of that valuation among 
the biggest fanatics. We have not counted this highly inelastic demand in our valuation. 
Second, we have made no adjustment to these estimates to account for the change 
in AOL’s pricing. While we are comfortable with this lack of adjustment—especially 
considering how AOL’s price change shapes our estimates—adoption is a slow process; 
and the price decline came too late in 2006 to have an effect on broadband adoption. It  
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almost goes without saying, but nobody expects that most broadband users would switch 
back to dial-up even if some dial-up became free.  
 Third, survey research tends to find a larger willingness to pay from users who 
are paying not to have something taken away after they have experienced it than those 
who are paying for something they have yet to experience. Savage and Waldman 
corrected for this effect by asking both users and nonusers about their valuations; 
however, the survey was conducted before widespread broadband adoption, so the 
answers about value would most likely be higher if the survey were conducted today 
among actual users. 
V.iii.  An Adjusted Price Index 
Standard economic reasoning suggests that the price index will be mismeasured when a 
new good results in large consumer surplus. That must be true in this example too. We 
briefly walk through the mechanics just to (1) verify that intuition, (2) provide a range for 
the estimates, and (3) decompose the causes. 
The standard recommendation is to use the adopters’ reservation value for the 
new good; that is, the price index should use the maximum of what a user would have 
been willing to expend to get the new good prior to adopting the new good. Thus, the 
starting point is straightforward. Converts were willing to pay a virtual price of $51.35 
per month on average, but had to pay less. For converts, this was equivalent to a decline 
in price of $11.35 ($15.35), but none of this was measured. In other words, against a $40 
($36) price for broadband, an average of $11.35 ($15.35) consumer surplus is equivalent 
to 22 %(30%) of the monthly price paid by converts for service.  
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We now ask how far a price index would have to fall in order to capture the gains 
that converts experienced. Table 7 illustrates this result, calculating a weighted average of 
the price change for each year as if only converts experienced a price decline. Weights 
fall into four categories: (1) dial-up users, (2) existing broadband users, (3) new 
broadband users who are new Internet users, and (4) broadband users making an upgrade 
this year. In the baseline specification, converts to broadband (who do not retire a second 
line, by construction) experience 13% decline in price (from $46 to $40) from 1999 to 
2001, which we represent as 0.87. Converts from 2002 to 2006 (who do retire a second 
line, by construction) experience a 22% decline in price (from $51.35 to $40), which we 
represent as 0.78. We assume all others experience no price decline, which we represent 
as 1.0.  
TABLE 7  Weighted average of price decline.  
     
















99.7 99.4 98.7 98.9 98.3 97.5 96.6 98.8 98.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
Baseline high price: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Baseline low price: Broadband Price = $36; 100% are converts 1999-01; 81% converts 2003-06 
Aggressive conversion: Broadband Price = $40; 100% are converts 1999-06 





Table 7 shows that this exercise results in an average price decline between 0.984 
and 0.978, because in most years only a small percentage of Internet access households 
upgraded to broadband. That means the price index for all Internet access should decline 
between 1.6% and 2.2% a year by 2006. In this exercise the correction is largest in the 
most recent years, when there are more upgrades as a percentage of all Internet 
households.  
Another way to represent the price decline is through a Paasche and Laspeyeres 
index over eight years—that is, using either the populations in 1999 and 2006 as the 
baseline. The baseline for the population matters because there was so much change in 
the characteristics of this population over these eight years. Table 4 shows that in 1999, 
there were 34.5 million dial-up users and 0.9 million broadband users. In 2006, there 
were 47 million broadband users and 34.7 million dial-up users. Hence, the 2006 Paasche 
and Laspeyeres indices will use different base populations because of (1) the entry of new 
Internet users who later convert to broadband; (2) the entry of new Internet users who use 
dial-up in 2006; and (3) the entry of new users who go straight to broadband.   
The different base years matters. If the population in 2006 serves as the baseline, 
then 48.9% (39.1/81.7) of households adopted broadband after converting from dial-up in 
the baseline estimates. In the baseline estimates, 24.5% (9.6/39.1) of households 
experienced a 13% price decline in 1999–2001 and 59.8% (23.4/39.1) experienced a 22% 
price decline from 2002–2006.
74 Over eight years that adds up to an 8.0% decline in the 
                                                 
74 It is plausible because we have 47 million broadband adopters by 2006. We began with 0.9 
million in 1999 and 7 million are new Internet users between 2002 and 2006 by construction. Of the  
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Internet access price index, even with high broadband prices (i.e., $40). It is an 11.2% 
decline in prices with lower broadband prices (i.e., $36). In contrast, if the 1999 
population serves as the baseline, then it is plausible that all of the users converted to 
broadband by 2006.
75 We assume adoption behavior consistent with our baseline model. 
That is, 9.6 million households experienced a 13% (21%) price decline between 1999 and 
2001 if broadband prices are $40 ($36). We assume the remainder (34.7 – 0.9 – 9.6 = 
24.2) upgraded between 2002–2006, and that translates into a 22% ($30) price decline. 
Accordingly, when broadband prices are $40 ($36), then this population experiences an 
18.4% (27.3%) price decline.
76 
The Paasche and Laspeyeres index brackets the estimates in Table 7.  The 
minimum is 8.0% (11.2%) and the maximum is 18.4% (27.4%), or an average of 1.0% 
(1.4%), and 2.1% (3.4%) decline per year. Our baseline results are 1.6% (2.2%), just 
between the minimum and maximum.
77  While the middle estimate is almost as much as 
AOL’s pricing decision in 2006, there is a big difference in the timing of the recorded 
price decline. AOL’s pricing decision concentrates the change in one year. In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                 
remainder, 9.6 million convert from dial-up to broadband between 1999 and 2001. Hence, if all households 
converted, then 23.4 million households converted between 2002 and 2006. This is well below 39.5 (47 - 7 
- 9.6 - 0.9). See Appendix. 
75 This seems natural to us since because it does not come close to the total 39.1 million broadband 
converts between 1999 and 2006. 
76 Using the 2006 broadband population as the baseline, we can estimate a price index that leaves 
out dial-up users, but is averaged over a different base. In the baseline estimate when prices are $40 ($36) 
we find that 20.8% (9.6/46.1) of upgrading households experienced an average of a 13% (21%) price 
decline from 1999–2001 and 63.9% (29.5/46.1) experienced a 22% (30%) price decline from 2002–2006, 
while 15.1% (7/46.1) experienced no price decline. That yields a 16.7% (23.4%) price decline over all eight 
years for upgrading households. Including all broadband users (i.e., adding the 0.9 million adopters prior to 
1999) yields 16.3% and 22.9%, respectively. 
77 The comparison in the text is over the entire population of households, and each household 
experiences only one upgrade, by construction. Hence, to make them comparable it is appropriate to look at 
the average rate of decline per year.  
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accounting for the upgrade when users upgraded would have realized a large fraction of 
the benefits many years sooner.   
That simulation informs the puzzling inconsistency between widespread adoption 
of broadband, as documented in Table 1, and the lack of measured appreciable decline in 
transactional prices over eight years, as displayed in Table 3. A properly measured 
broadband price index shows a large change in prices, resolving this apparent puzzle. If 
the pricing concentrates on a population of households that were early adopters of the 
Internet, then the unmeasured price decline is quite large. 
We now decompose the underlying cause of these conclusions by asking: How 
much price decline arises from the retirement of second phone lines? As it turns out, 
second lines are not as important as new surplus from conversion. For example, in our 
baseline estimates for $40 broadband, the gain is $11.35. The dropped second phone line 
is responsible for $5.35, while the consumer surplus is responsible for $6. When the 
baseline price is $36, then consumer surplus is comparatively more important. The 
second line is still responsible for $5.35, but consumer surplus is now responsible for 
$10. These expenses only shape decision making during 2002–2006 in the baseline 
estimates. In other words, removing the savings on the second line from the price index 
would remove anywhere from a 30% to 40% of the total savings in 2002–2006, or 21% 
to 28% of the savings for 1999–2006.   
BLS price indices do not normally count the savings of expenditure in one 
category (on a second telephone line) as an input into calculating the price index for 
another (Internet access). We appreciate this procedural norm, but we are not fully 
sympathetic due to the misunderstanding it produces for policy. Accounting should take  
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place somewhere, and if not, the absence of such accounting should be acknowledged so 
policy users of the price indices can properly interpret what they observe.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
We contend that conventional accounting of broadband’s effect on the US economy 
mismeasures its true economic impact. While broadband accounts for $28 billion of the 
GDP in 2006, approximately $20 to $22 billion is associated with household use in 2006. 
Of that amount, we show that approximately $8.3 and $10.6 billion of it is additional 
revenue (above and beyond what dial-up would have generated), and between $6.7 and 
$4.8 billion is consumer surplus.  That is, broadband generates new additional revenue 
between 40% and 50% of measured GDP, while consumer surplus (which is not 
measured) is between 31% and 47% of the newly created revenue. The upgrade was 
equivalent to an unmeasured decline in price of between 1.6% and 2.2% per year in all 
Internet access prices. 
The paper has focused on measuring the factors that shaped the anticipated 
incremental costs and benefits from the national upgrade to broadband. More accurate 
measurement illustrates why policy oriented towards relying on private investment 
succeeded as it did: The incremental returns were sufficiently large enough to generate 
large investments by broadband providers, especially cable firms. It also illustrated why 
the gains from the upgrade were large to users in spite of seemingly unchanged nominal  
47 
 
transactional prices. The commonly used government statistics, such as a BLS price 
index, did not measure the full gains to broadband adopters.  
We have focused on topics for which we can put some bounds on the size of the 
measurement issues, albeit imperfectly. However, we do not want to leave the impression 
that this settles measurement questions, as many other issues related to quality 
adjustments still remain decidedly unsettled. Since these are difficult to measure, they 
will likely prove difficult to fix. As a brief example, many broadband firms have recently 
upgraded the bandwidth of their lines without increasing prices for consumers; such 
upgrades are difficult to record and measure. In addition, the Internet access price index 
does not adjust for the improvement in the quality of the many free complements that 
have become available over this time period, such as improvements in the Google search 
engine, Yahoo! portal, MSN instant messaging client, or caching by Akamai. These 
investments increase the quality of the Internet experience for users.   
In addition, our estimates did not include an analysis of the benefits versus costs 
not considered by parties involved in the transaction. In the body of the text we included 
a range of examples that might incrementally shape the experience at Cisco, Amazon, 
and Google. We would expect similar externalities to shape the experience of a wide 
range of firms, including Apple, Microsoft, and Intel, as well as many venture capitalists. 
We expect many more such examples. Similarly, we did not include externalities to users, 
and we can plausibly think of several related mechanisms that would produce both 
positive and negative externalities. However, we have tried not to allow the presence of 
externalities in broadband economics to become a license to inflate the gains from the 
deployment of broadband, so we await further work on this topic.  
48 
 
We do not, therefore, view our own attempts here as the final word on the 
estimation of the size of these effects; rather, we view them as an attempt to benchmark 
the size of the issues in one specific case, and by showing their scale, motivate others to 
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Adjustments for Table 2. 
Table 2 is constructed from the Annual Service Survey, conducted by the US Census. 
The Census Service Annual Survey is available for NAICS 51, as archived on 
http://www.census.gov/econ/www/servmenu.html. The annual surveys differ from the 
five-year economic censuses. The annual service surveys are estimates of economic 
activity, not complete censuses of economic activity. They are designed to provide short-
run estimation at a greater frequency than every five years.  
In general these estimates are based on a particular sampling frame (i.e., data 
collected from a small group of firms). In rapidly changing industries, such sampling 
frames can, and do, become outdated quickly. The Census alters the sampling frame 
frequently (as often as every three or four years), but it does not apply new lessons to old 
data. That is, it does not use a new sampling frame to re-estimate archival data. Hence, 
historical inconsistencies run throughout this data, particularly in years when new 
sampling frames are introduced (in this case that occurs between 2000 and 2001, and 
between 2003 and 2004).  
The Annual Survey does not provide guidance about how to adjust data to make 
inconsistent historical data consistent with each other. Conversations with employees 
indicated no plans to correct historical inconsistencies. In all cases, we try to stay as close 
as possible to data in published reports and to use the latest publication, which sometimes 
corrects for errors in sampling frame.   
53 
 
We take advantage of a lucky break in 2004. The Census published two sets of 
estimates, one using an old sampling frame and (a few months later) one using the new. 
This permitted a direct comparison of the two sampling frames and a correction for prior 
years (i.e., 2001, 2002, and 2003).  
Cable modem revenue 
 For 1998, 1999, and 2000, the original data were taken from the tables for NAICS 5175, 
from the 2000 report. The data in 2001, 2002 and 2003 came from the listing for NAICS 
5175, from the report for 2004, which uses a new sampling frame that differs from prior 
years. The data for 2004, 2005, and 2006 came from NAICS 5175, from the 2005 report, 
which also used a new sampling frame. Due to a change in the sampling frame, the data 
from 2004–2006 were no longer consistent with the data from 2001–2003. For 2004, 
there were estimates using both sampling frames, and the data for the new sampling 
frame (used in 2004–2006) were found to be 10% higher than the old sampling frame 
(used in 2001–2004). For consistency, data in 2001, 2002, and 2003 were adjusted 
upward 10%. 
 DSL revenue 
The Census Annual Survey did not report DSL revenue as a separate item prior to 2001. 
The data for 2001, 2002, and 2003 originally came from NAICS 5133 and do not include 
backbone services. Data for 2004, 2005, and 2006 came from NAICS 5171, from the 
2006 report, which used a new sampling frame. As with the other data, due to a change in 
the sampling frame, the data from 2004–2005 were potentially inconsistent with the data 
from 2001–2003. For 2004, there were estimates using both sampling frames and the data 
for the new sampling frame (used in 2004–2006) was found to be inconsistent with the  
54 
 
old sampling frame (used in 2001–2004).  Data in 2001, 2002, and 2003 were not 
adjusted by a fixed percentage, because doing so would have led to implausibly high 
revenue in 2001 and 2002 that would be inconsistent with FCC and Pew data on the 
number and growth of deployed DSL lines. To generate a series consistent with 2004 and 
with the FCC data on deployment, we started with 2004 and worked backwards to data 
for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. These have growth rates similar to growth in total 
DSL lines, as reported by the FCC data on user growth in DSL lines—both business and 
household users, not just households as reported in Table 1 (though the data were taken 
from the same source). These replace all reported numbers in 2001, 2002, and 2003; and 
these replace missing values in 1999 and 2000.  
Dial-up revenue 
The original data in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were taken from the tables for NAICS 514191, 
from the 2000 report. The data in 2001, 2002, and 2003 came from the table for NAICS 
514191, which used a new sampling frame from prior years. The data for 2004, 2005, and 
2006 were for NAICS 5181111, from the 2006 report, which also used a new sampling 
frame. Due to a change in the sampling frame, the data from 2004–2006 were no longer 
consistent with the data from 2001–2003. For 2004, there were estimates using both 
sampling frames. The data for the new sampling frame (used in 2004–2006) were found 
to be 33% higher than the old sampling frame (used in 2001–2004). For consistency, data 




The data for 2004 and 2005 came from NAICS 517212, from the report for 2005. The 
report includes Internet access services for wireless carriers, but not satellite services. 
Disclosure issues prevented publication in 2006. 
Prior to adjustment for sampling frame inconsistencies, the reports from the 




  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Dial-up 
revenue 
5499  8966  12345 10339 10596 10656 14081 12240 10983 
Cable 
revenue 
138 274 903 2364  3743  6702  9435  11139  13156 
DSL 
revenue 
    4917 4343 4329 11924  13561  15066 
Wireless 
revenue 
   668  1140  .
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